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We extend consideration of cumulative harm in products liability to the case of bilat-
eral care. For this specification, the level of care and the level of output chosen by the
firm are inextricably interrelated, and different liability regimes yield different com-
binations of care and output. As in the case of bilateral care with proportional harm,
strict liability by itself leads to moral hazard on the part of the consumer, but strict
liability with a defense of contributory negligence on the part of the consumer is now
a resilient (that is, both robust and convergent) liability rule when harm is cumulative.
(JEL: K13, L15, D42)
1. Introduction
In the traditional law and economics model of products liability with
observable care, expected harm is proportional to the consumer’s use of
the product (see e.g., Shavell, 1980, 2007; Landes and Posner, 1985). As a
consequence, the socially efficient levels of care for both the firm and the
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consumer (if care is bilateral) are independent of the level of output in the
market. When only the firm can affect the expected harm through its choice
of care (care is unilateral), then socially efficient care levels can be achieved
in equilibrium by employing various liability rules, including strict liability,
no liability, and negligence. When care is bilateral, then strict liability must
be augmented with a defense of contributory negligence to restore incen-
tives for socially efficient care; the regimes of no liability and negligence
continue to generate socially efficient care without modification.
The fact that socially efficient and equilibrium care levels are indepen-
dent of the level of consumption means that the tort system can focus on
optimizing “product performance” (i.e., the level of care and resulting prod-
uct safety) while other agencies or bodies of law can focus on “market per-
formance” (i.e., the level of output and resulting total surplus).We do in fact
observe divided responsibilities in our complex system of regulatory and
common law. The traditional products liability model suggests that divided
responsibilities do not entail a social loss, since no coordination among poli-
cies is required to achieve the joint socially efficient combination of care
and output.
In a previous paper (Daughety and Reinganum, 2014, hereafter
DR2014), we show that when the consumer’s expected harm is cumulative
in consumption (i.e., expected harm increases more-than-proportionally in
the amount consumed)1 and care is unilateral, then the socially efficient lev-
els of care and output are “entangled.” That is, there is a different efficient
level of care for each given level of output, and a different efficient level of
output for each given level of care. Profit-maximizing levels of output and
care are similarly entangled. We show that strict liability and no liability
1. Marino (1988) introduces the notion of cumulative harm (and its opposite, toler-
ance). See DR2014 for an extensive discussion of goods wherein expected harm is likely
to be cumulative. These include pharmaceuticals (e.g., the Exelon patch and opiod pain
relievers) and over-the-counter medications (e.g., acetaminophen and NSAIDS) wherein
the likelihood and severity of side effects increase with dosage; foods that may har-
bor bacteria in sufficient quantities to cause illness (e.g., chicken contaminated with
Salmonella, ground beef contaminated with E. coli, and cold cuts or melon contaminated
with listeria); goods involving exposure to chemicals or radiation that bioaccumulates in
the body (e.g., products containing asbestos or lead, fish containing mercury, and CT
scans or X-rays); goods with rapidly moving parts (such as motors) that deteriorate with
wear; and activities that can be “tracked” (e.g., as in online environments), which can
generate expected harm through loss of privacy.
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now generate different choices of care and output, while negligence simply
devolves into strict liability. Although strict liability does not generate the
overall socially efficient combination of care and output, it does generate
socially efficient care for any given level of output (while no liability gen-
erates excessive care for any given level of output).
In DR2014 we define a resilient liability rule as one that displays two
properties: (1) it is robust in the sense that it continues to work well even if
the firm’s choice of care is unobservable, and it is not unstable (in the way
that negligence is, even with observable care); and (2) it is convergent in the
sense that it responds appropriately to welfare-enhancing improvements in
output undertaken by another agency or body of law tasked with optimizing
market performance. In particular, as the level of output converges to its
socially efficient level, a rule of strict liability causes the firm’s choice of
care to converge to its socially efficient level while a rule of no liability
causes the firm’s choice of care to diverge from its socially efficient level.
In this paper, we extend our model of products liability with cumula-
tive expected harm to the case of bilateral care. We pose the model as one
of sequential care-taking, wherein the firm takes care in manufacturing the
product and the consumer subsequently takes care in using the product. We
show that strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence on the
part of the consumer results in the socially efficient levels of care for both
the firm and the consumer for any given level of output (whereas no liability
does not achieve this conditional efficiency). In particular, we find that, for
any given level of output, the firm prefers to choose its care level so as to
induce the consumer to subsequently meet her due-care requirement; this
implies that the firm prefers to face strict liability rather than no liability.
Consequently, strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence dis-
plays the qualities of robustness and convergence described above; it is the
resilient liability rule.
Plan of the Paper: In Section 2, we provide a detailed review of
related literature. In Section 3, we briefly review the proportional-harm
model results, allowing for sequential choice of care. We then analyze the
cumulative-harm model under bilateral sequential care-taking, and show
that strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence is a resilient
liability rule, whereas a rule of no liability is not resilient. In Section 4, we
provide a brief summary and conclusion; the Appendix provides some of
the more technical arguments.
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2. Literature Review
In this paper, we will employ a model of harm in which both the firm
and the (representative) consumer can exert care to lower the expected harm
(that is, wewill use a “bilateral-care”model) andwherein the expected harm
is cumulative in the sense that it is increasing at a more-than-proportional
rate in the amount of the good consumed. Thus, the model we use has
antecedents in the proportional-harmmodel (wherein expected harm is pro-
portional to the amount of the good consumed) under both unilateral and
bilateral care. It is also related to more recent work on models of cumula-
tive harm with unilateral care. We will discuss these strands of the literature
in turn.
As indicated in Section 1, when: (1) only the firm can exert care to
reduce the expected harm (a unilateral-care model); (2) care is observable
prior to purchase; (3) the cost of production-plus-care per unit of output is
constant; and (4) the expected harm per unit of output consumed is con-
stant (a proportional-harm model), then all standard liability regimes (strict
liability, negligence, and no liability) yield the socially efficient level of
care (Shavell, 1980; Landes and Posner, 1985). The firm’s level of output
need not be the socially efficient level if the firm has some market power,
but since the socially efficient level of care is independent of the level of
output in the proportional-harm model, the court can choose the liability
regime without concern for the structure of the market (e.g., the degree of
competitiveness).
When care is unilateral, but expected harm is cumulative, then the
socially efficient levels of care and output are “entangled” (this is also true
for the profit-maximizing levels of care and output).2 That is, there is a dif-
ferent efficient level of care for any given level of output, and a different
efficient level of output for any given level of care. Moreover, the firm will
face different harm-related costs under different liability rules. In particular,
when the firm is subject to strict liability, then its choice of care will be
2. This interdependence is explored in early papers by Spence (1975) and
Sheshinski (1976) wherein a monopolist chooses product quality rather than investment
in care (and abstracting from issues of warranty or liability). More recent papers in law
and economics wherein choices of output and care are interdependent include Polinsky
(1980); Polinsky and Rogerson (1983), and Daughety and Reingnaum (2006); this inter-
dependence arises in these models for various reasons that are unrelated to cumulative
harm.
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socially efficient for any given level of output since it will face the average
expected harm per unit sold. However, it will produce too little output for
any given level of care (due to its monopoly power). Therefore, when harm
is cumulative the firm will ultimately produce too little output and exert too
little care under strict liability (Marino, 1988; Spulber, 1989; DR2014).3
On the other hand, when the firm is subject to no liability, then the con-
sumer’s demand will reflect this via her deduction of the marginal expected
harm from her marginal willingness-to-pay for the good. Since the marginal
expected harm exceeds the average expected harm when expected harm is
cumulative, the firm will face higher liability-related harms when these are
conveyed through the market behavior of the consumer than when they are
conveyed directly through strict liability. In this case, the firm exerts exces-
sive care for any given level of output, but produces even less output for
any given level of care than does the firm facing strict liability. Under no
liability, a firm with market power ultimately produces too little output, and
that output is excessively safe (DR2014).
In addition, in DR2014 we find that the negligence regime is unstable in
the sense that the firm, which prefers strict liability to no liability (due to the
aforementioned reduction in the consumer’s marginal willingness-to-pay at
the rate of marginal expected harm), intentionally violates the negligence
standard in order to provoke strict liability. For the quadratic expected harm
function used therein we find that welfare is higher at the equilibrium under
strict liability than at the equilibrium under no liability. All of these results
point towards strict liability as the best liability regime, although it does not
achieve the overall social-welfare optimum when firms have market power.
3. Marino (1988) considers a unilateral-care monopoly model under strict liability
and no liability, and compares the associated market outcomes to the socially efficient
outcome, obtaining the aforementioned interdependence between output and care; see
also Spulber (1989). In DR2014, we focus not only on cumulative harm and unilateral
care, but we also include negligence as a liability rule and obtain more comprehensive
welfare rankings. In addition, we provide two versions of an oligopoly model wherein
firms chose output levels: (1) the independent-harms model, wherein each firm’s output
is identifiable and the expected harm associated with one product does not depend on
other firms’ output levels and (2) the joint-harm model wherein the firms’ outputs are
indistinguishable and the expected harm is cumulative in the consumer’s aggregate con-
sumption of all products in the relevant market. In the independent-harms model, strict
liability continues to be the resilient policy; in the joint-harm model a modified version
of market-share liability (which is also a version of strict liability) is the resilient policy.
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In DR2014, we observe that, although there is inherent interdependency
in the choices of care and output, the responsibilities for “product perfor-
mance” (which encompasses the level of care taken and safety achieved)
and “market performance” (which encompasses the level of prices and out-
put) are not centralized, but rather are distributed across different govern-
ment regulatory agencies and bodies of law. Rather than expecting any one
court or agency to solve the entire problem, we argue that strict liability is
a resilient policy in that it is stable (unlike negligence); it is robust to the
possibility that consumers cannot observe the firm’s care prior to purchase
(unlike no liability); and as another agency tasked with optimizing market
performance moves the output level toward the socially efficient level (e.g.,
through output subsidies), the firm’s profit-maximizing level of care will
converge along with output to the socially efficient level (again, unlike no
liability, which results in increasingly excessive care). Thus, by adopting
strict liability, the tort system can focus on product performance, anticipat-
ing that market performance will be optimized by another regulatory agency
or body of law and legal precedent.
While strict liability is not problematic in a context wherein consumer
care plays no role, it is highly problematic when consumer care is also
important in avoiding harm. In particular, when the consumer is fully com-
pensated for harm due to the use of the product, it is optimal for her to
exert no effort on care.4 This has led, in the proportional-harm bilateral-
care model, to considering the use of strict liability with a defense of con-
tributory negligence. That is, the firm is strictly liable unless the consumer
was contributorily negligent by taking less care than is specified by a due-
care standard (e.g., Shavell, 1980; Landes and Posner, 1985, where it is
implicitly assumed that both parties choose their levels of care simultane-
ously). We extend this result to the case of cumulative harm below, where
we also modify the timing of play to be more consistent with reality; that is,
we assume that the firm’s choice of care is made at the time of production
while the consumer’s choice of care is made at the time of use. This sequen-
tial structure allows the firm to use its first-mover choice of care to influence
the consumer’s subsequent choice of care.
4. Obviously, to the extent that she is under-compensated even under strict liability,
the consumer will exert effort on care; nevertheless, she is likely to exert too little effort
as compared to the socially efficient amount.
Cumulative Harm, Products Liability, and Bilateral Care 415
There are two previous papers that have modeled the sequential choice
of care in a bilateral-care model of accidents, Wittman (1981) and Shavell
(1983); in addition to these formal models, see Landes and Posner (1981)
for a discussion of the sequential choice of care in the accident setting. Note
that, in a model of accidents, in contrast with that of products liability, there
is generally no market through which the consumer can transmit her pref-
erences over safety. Wittman (1981) analyzes a model wherein two parties
sequentially choose their levels of care; he argues for “marginal cost” lia-
bility rules wherein the first mover is liable for the harm plus the cost of
the second-mover’s socially efficient level of care (as a function of the first-
mover’s actual level of care). This rule (and other related rules) induces
the second mover to respond in a socially efficient way to the first-mover’s
choice of care, and induces the first mover to choose his socially efficient
level of care. Wittman does not consider the rule of strict liability with a
defense of contributory negligence. Shavell (1983) analyzes an accident
model in which one party (either victim or injurer) chooses her level of care
first in order to influence whether or not a dangerous condition will pre-
vail. The other party, observing the first party’s choice of care and whether
or not a dangerous condition prevails, chooses his level of care in order to
influence the ultimate likelihood of an accident.
Our model differs from both Wittman’s and Shavell’s in that our parties
have a buyer-seller relationship, so it is most plausible to assume that the
firm chooses its level of care first (during the design or production stage)
while the consumer chooses her level of care second (during use of the prod-
uct). This price-mediated relationship means that, even if the consumer was
expected to fail to meet her due-care standard (so that the firm expects to
face no direct liability for the consumer’s harm), the firm itself would invest
in care in order to be able to charge a higher price for the product. Thus, we
find that under strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence,
the socially efficient levels of care will arise (for a given level of output),
whereas for this same sequence of moves Shavell finds that strict liability
with a defense of contributory negligence does not result in the socially
efficient care levels.
Finally, there is some previous literature on the desirability of divided
responsibilities. Shavell (1981) and Kaplow and Shavell (1994) ask whether
responsibility for (1) providing incentives for care to potential injurers; and
(2) effecting income redistribution can and should be divided between two
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entities, such as a legal rule specifying efficient damages and a tax authority
to perform any desired redistribution. They argue that (with some qualifi-
cations) the answer is “Yes,” since redistribution via either the legal sys-
tem or the tax system induces distortions in the labor-leisure tradeoff, while
redistribution via the legal system also induces distortions in care-taking. In
our model, we take the situation of divided responsibilities for product and
market performance as given, and ask whether one can identify a particular
liability rule that works best in combination with agencies or other entities
that are tasked with improving market performance.
3. Sequential Choice of Care Under Proportional
and Cumulative Harm
We now detail the game between the firm and the consumer when care
is bilateral and then apply it in two contexts: (1) when expected harm is
proportional to the level of use of the product; and (2) when expected harm
is cumulative with respect to the level of use of the product. The reason
for item (1) is to illustrate the application of the game form wherein the
firm moves first, followed by the consumer, in a familiar setting. In the
proportional-harm case with bilateral care one would expect that strict lia-
bility for the firm (denoted as SL) will result in insufficient care-taking by
the consumer, reflecting problems of moral hazard. The standard solution
when the parties choose care simultaneously is to employ strict liability for
the firm with a defense of contributory negligence (denoted as SLD) on the
part of the consumer. This liability regime also provides the correct incen-
tives for care under sequential choice of care, as does a regime of no liability
for the firm (denoted asNL), when harm is proportional to use.We then turn
to the cumulative harm case and show that, in the context of the same game
form, SLD is the only resilient liability policy.
3.1. Description of the Sequential Care-Choice Game
We envision a market that consists of a single firm and many identical
consumers; the monopolist chooses quantity.5 Wewill assume a very simple
5. In DR2014 we discuss, at some length, the reason for using quantity as a strate-
gic variable for the monopolist. In that paper we also consider the possibility of an n-firm
oligopolistic industry.
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cost structure wherein the firm’s cost of production and care is constant per
unit of output, and the consumer’s cost of care is also constant per unit of
output. This means that welfare and firm profits can be expressed on a per-
consumer basis and we can examine the firm’s interaction with a single
representative consumer.
We consider the following general protocol. Given any specific liability
regime, the consumer and firm play as follows.
1. The firm simultaneously chooses a level of care, x , and the amount
of the good to produce, q.6 The amount of the good, the level of
care, and the liability regime together imply a price, p, for the good
in the product market, to be determined as part of the analysis to
come.
2. The consumer, observing p and x , acquires an amount q of the good,
anticipating the amount of care she will choose to employ, y, in the
actual use of the product.
3. The consumer chooses her level of care, y, possibly subject to con-
straints reflecting how liability is apportioned between her and the
firm if, say, a defense of contributory negligence was available to
the firm. This detail will be made clearer in the relevant portions of
the analysis.
We will assume a full-information game, so the firm is able to anticipate
correctly the consumer’s marginal willingness-to-pay for the good and the
care she will subsequently take in using it. Moreover, in the case of strict
liability, we assume that the consumer obtains perfect compensation. We
make these assumptions so that it is clear that results that distinguish the
traditional (proportional-harm) model from those of the cumulative-harm
model are fully attributable to the change in the modeling of expected harm,
and are not due to, say, the presence of asymmetric information. We will
provide a welfare analysis wherein a “central planner” chooses and dictates
the levels of q, x , and y. In the analysis of the game between the firm and
the consumer, we employ subgame perfection, so we first analyze the con-
sumer’s choice of y for any given amount of the good purchased and any
given firm investment in care-taking. We then back up a step to find the
6. The firm might instead be modeled as choosing x and q sequentially, but it is
straightforward to show that this has no impact on the resulting choices.
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consumer’s marginal willingness-to-pay for the good, and finally we find
the firm’s profit-maximizing choices of output and care.
In what follows we employ the following notation and functions:
u(q): The consumer’s direct utility in use for q units of the prod-
uct; we assume that u′(q) > 0 and u′′(q) < 0 for all q.
H(q, x, y): The expected harm when the firm chooses care level
x , the consumer (she) buys an amount q of the prod-
uct, and she uses care level y. In the proportional-
harm case, H(q, x, y) ≡ h(x, y)q, where h(x, y) is the
per-unit expected harm, while for the cumulative harm
case we analyze the simplest modification, H(q, x, y) ≡
h(x, y)q2, where now h(x, y)q is the per-unit expected
harm. Assume that h(x, y) > 0 for all finite values of x
and y. We assume the following first and second deriva-
tive properties for h: hx < 0; hy < 0; hxx > 0; and hyy >
0. That is, for each agent, their choice of care reduces
expected harm but at a diminishing rate. We assume
that hxxhyy − (hxy)2 > 0, so as to provide sufficient con-
ditions for the optimization conditions to characterize
maxima.
xq, yq: Respectively: (1) total production cost and cost of care on
the part of the firm, and (2) total effort cost for taking care
on the part of the consumer.
W (q, x, y): Welfare for any given level of (q, x, y). In general,
W (q, x, y) = u(q) − H(q, x, y) − xq − yq.
π j (q, x |y): The firm’s profits for any given choice of (q, x) under
liability regime j ( j =NL, SL, or SLD) and given the
consumer’s anticipated level of care, y. The exact form
of the profit function will be specified as the analysis
proceeds.
Furthermore, to avoid getting bogged down in technical complexities, we
assume that all (unconstrained) optimization problems have unique interior
maxima.
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3.2. Proportional Harm with Bilateral Care
We consider the proportional-harm model first, deriving results for the
socially efficient level of output and investments by the firm and the con-
sumer, and thenwe turn to the three regimes of interest,NL, SL, and SLD.We
then compare these results with those found in Shavell (1983) and explain
the sources of the difference in results.
3.2.1. Efficiency. Let us first find the values of q, x , and y that character-
ize a socially efficient outcome (i.e., that maximize W (q, x, y)). Thus, we
wish to examine the first-order conditions for the problem:
max
(q,x,y)
u(q) − h(x, y)q − xq − yq;
these conditions are:
q : u′(q) − h(x, y) − x − y = 0, (1)
x :−hx (x, y)q − q = 0, (2)
y :−hy(x, y)q − q = 0. (3)
Equation (1) states the familiar condition for efficiency of the output choice:
marginal utility, u′(q), equals total marginal cost, h(x, y) + x + y. Equa-
tions (2) and (3) express that, with respect to either care choice alone, the
marginal benefit of an increase in care should just equal the marginal cost
(i.e., −hz(x, y)q = q, for z = x or y at the optimum). In what follows we
focus on conditions such as Equations (2) and (3) to derive the level of care
for an agent such as the firm or the consumer under welfare maximiza-
tion (or later under profit maximization in the context of a specific liability
regime).
Consider the solutions of each individual optimality condition as an
expression of the level of a decision variable as a function of the other
variables. In particular, xW (q, y) solves Equation (2) and yW (q, x) solves
Equation (3), where the superscriptW indexes the solution functions arising
from the welfare maximization problem. Moreover, since q is positive, we
can divide by q in each equation and therefore simplify the pair of functions
xW (q, y) and yW (q, x) to be, respectively – and slightly abusing notation
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– xW (y) and yW (x). These functions describe the levels of care chosen by
(respectively) the firm and the consumer, assuming welfare maximization,
and we see that each agent’s efficient level of investment in care depends
upon the other agent’s (arbitrary) level of care, but it does not depend upon
the level of output produced (or, equivalently, quantity consumed). Given
our assumptions on the function h(x, y), these functions are either both
upward-sloping or both downward-sloping (see the Appendix for details).
If the overall solution to Equations (1)–(3) is denoted as (q∗, x∗, y∗),
then x∗ = xW (y∗) and y∗ = yW (x∗), while q∗ satisfies u′(q∗) = h(x∗, y∗) +
x∗ + y∗. Note that it is the proportionality of expected harm (along with the
linear care and production costs, yq and xq, respectively) that provides the
traditional result that the efficient investment in safety is independent of
the level of output.
3.2.2. No Liability. We now consider the game between the firm and the
consumer described earlier, starting with the consumer (that is, working
backward). Thus, for arbitrary x and q we first characterize the level of care
the consumer takes in using the product when the regime is no liability; as
will be seen below, this level is independent of q but does depend on x , and
thus we denote it as yNL(x).
For fixed x and q the consumer’s payoff reduces to the expected harm
plus the cost of taking care, which should be minimized:
min
y
h(x, y)q + yq,
yielding the first-order-condition:
hy(x, y)q + q = 0. (4)
Again, for q positive this means that we can solve Equation (4) to obtain the
level of care to be taken by the consumer as a function of that taken by the
firm, yNL(x). Comparing with Equation (3) we see that yNL(x) = yW (x) for
all x , so that the consumer’s choice of care for any given level of investment
in care made by the firm is the efficient amount; note that this does not
automatically ensure, however, that the equilibrium level under no liability,
denoted as yNL∗, is the same as y∗.
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We next turn to finding the consumer’s choice of quantity to demand
(which yields the consumer’s marginal willingness-to-pay, or inverse
demand function); this comes from the overall maximization problem for
the consumer, where the consumer rationally anticipates using her best
choice-of-care rule, yNL(x):
max
q
u(q) − h(x, yNL(x))q − yNL(x)q − pq, (5)
where p is the price paid by the consumer for each unit of the product. The
first-order-condition yields the inverse demand function, p(q, x |yNL(x)):
p(q, x |yNL(x)) = u′(q) − h(x, yNL(x)) − yNL(x). (6)
That is, the consumer deducts the (per unit) expected harm and care cost,
both conditional on the continuing optimal choice of the level of care by the
consumer, from the marginal utility for the good to obtain her net marginal
willingness-to-pay. Thus, the firm’s profit function under NL, denoted as
πNL(q, x |yNL(x)), is
πNL(q, x |yNL(x)) = (u′(q) − h(x, yNL(x)) − yNL(x))q − xq. (7)
The details of the firm’s choice of x and q are given in the Appendix. But it
is clear from the profit function (and Equation (4)) that xNL∗ = x∗ and thus
yNL∗ ≡ yNL(xNL∗) = yNL(x∗) = yW (x∗) = y∗; that is, yNL∗ = y∗. Therefore,
under no liability, the firm and the consumer choose the socially efficient
levels of care. Of course, since the firm is a monopoly, it will produce less
than the socially efficient level of output; that is, qNL∗ < q∗.
PROPOSITION 1 (a) In the proportional-harm model, a regime of no liability
results in the firm and the consumer using the socially efficient levels of
care: xNL∗ = x∗ and yNL∗ = y∗.
(b) In the proportional-harm model, a regime of no liability results in the
monopolist producing too little output: qNL∗ < q∗.
3.2.3. Strict Liability and Strict Liability with a Defense of Contributory
Negligence. We first consider the consumer’s choice of care under a
regime of strict liability. For fixed x and q the consumer’s payoff reduces to
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the expected harm plus the cost of taking care, which should be minimized;
but since all harms are compensated by the firm, the consumer’s objective
is miny yq. Thus, for q > 0, ySL∗ = 0< yW ∗ . Therefore, strict liability alone
cannot result in the bilateral choices of the efficient levels of care.
Now assume that the firm has a potential defense of contributory neg-
ligence on the part of the consumer, so that if the consumer took due care
the firm is strictly liable, while if the consumer failed to take due care the
firm is not liable for any harm (independent of the level of care taken by
the firm). By due care, we mean that the consumer must take care that is
at least the socially efficient level; that is, we interpret the due-care stan-
dard as requiring y  y∗. Thus, after buying an amount q, the consumer’s
care-choice problem is the following:
min
y
yq subject to y  y∗. (8)
Since q > 0, if the consumer chooses to satisfy the constraint, then ySLD∗ =
y∗. Therefore, at this point in the game (where the firm’s choice of x is fixed
and the consumer has already purchased q units), the minimal expenditure
on care by the consumer is y∗q.
Importantly, since the consumer chooses y after the firm has chosen x ,
the consumer might find y∗q to be a higher expected cost than if she were
to violate the standard, knowing that she would then have to bear the cost
of any harm. That is, should the consumer choose not to meet the due-
care standard, she will face the cost of the harm plus any expenditure on
care, as the regime now is equivalent to NL. This expected cost would be
h(x, yNL(x))q + yNL(x)q. Dividing by q, we can define two sets of care
levels for the firm:
M = {x |ySLD∗  h(x, yNL(x)) + yNL(x)},
which is the set of x-choices by the firm such that the consumer will find
it optimal to meet the due-care standard, meaning the firm is strictly liable
for the harm; and
m = {x |ySLD∗ > h(x, yNL(x)) + yNL(x)},
which is the set of x-choices by the firm such that the consumer will find
it optimal to not meet the due-care standard, meaning the firm is not liable
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for the harm. Recall that ySLD∗ = y∗, the socially efficient level of care; we
continue to use the notation ySLD∗ to emphasize that this is the consumer’s
choice of care under SLD when she chooses to meet the due-care standard.
Therefore, the consumer’s marginal willingness-to-pay for output
depends onwhether x is inM orm. If x is inM , the inverse demand function
for the consumer is
p(q, x |ySLD∗) = u′(q) − ySLD∗. (9)
If, on the other hand, x is in m, then the consumer adjusts her demand to
reflect the fact that she will have to bear any costs associated with harm,
making her inverse demand the same as would occur under NL:
p(q, x |yNL(x)) = u′(q) − h(x, yNL(x)) − yNL(x). (10)
Thus, when it chooses x in M , the firm’s profit function is as if it were under
SL,7 except with a consumer choice of y = ySLD∗ = y∗ instead of y = 0:
πSLD(q, x |ySLD∗) = (u′(q) − ySLD∗)q − h(x, ySLD∗)q − xq for x in M
= π SL(q, x |y∗) for x in M; (11)
whereas it is as if it were under NL when it chooses x in m:
πSLD(q, x |yNL(x)) = (u′(q) − h(x, yNL(x))q − yNL(x))q − xq for x in m
= πNL(q, x |yNL(x)) for x in m. (12)
In the Appendix, we show two important results (which are fairly
straightforward under proportional harm, but will be a bit more compli-
cated under cumulative harm): (1) the socially efficient firm care level, x∗,
belongs to M ;8 and (2) the firm will always prefer to choose a level of care
that will induce the consumer tomeet the due-care standard. Since the firm’s
most-preferred care level in M is x∗, and since x∗ induces the consumer to
choose y∗, it follows that SLD achieves the socially efficient levels of care,
7. In a manner similar to the definition of πNL(q, x |y), the firm’s profit under SL
as a function of q, x , and y, is given by πSL(q, x |y) = (u′(q) − y)q − h(x, y)q − xq.
8. It is worth observing that, since x∗ is in the interior of M , small changes in
x near x∗ still result in y = y∗. This will then lead to x∗ being chosen by the firm, so
Proposition 2 has a “built-in” robustness to small errors in the choice of x .
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though it also provides an inefficiently low level of output, again reflecting
the firm’s monopoly power.
PROPOSITION 2 In the proportional-harm model, a regime of strict liability
with a defense of contributory negligence results in the socially efficient
choices of level of care (xSLD∗ = x∗ and ySLD∗ = y∗) but a socially ineffi-
cient level of output (qSLD∗ < q∗).
3.2.4. Comparison with Previous Results. The primary point of compar-
ison is with Shavell (1983). The relevant case is Shavell’s discussion of the
sequential-care model when the injurer moves first, wherein he finds that
SLD does not achieve the socially efficient levels of care. There are two
substantive differences between our model and Shavell’s model. First, in
Shavell’s model the victim’s contributory negligence standard is modeled
as the constraint y  yW (x); and second, there is no market relationship
between the parties. The use of yW (x) as the due-care standard means that
the injurer can influence the victim’s due-care standard; since (in his model)
a decrease in the injurer’s care level causes an increase in the victim’s care
level, the injurer can shift some of the costs of care to the victim by choosing
an inefficiently low level of care (x < x∗). This shifting is valuable to the
injurer in Shavell’s model because there is no market relationship between
the parties; if there were, then this cost-shifting would be reflected in a lower
marginal willingness-to-pay on the part of the consumer and it would not
be valuable to the firm. Our implementation of SLD, wherein we require
y  y∗, means that for the consumer’s costs of harm to be covered by the
firm, she must meet a due-care standard that is the socially efficient level of
care. However, should the consumer choose not to meet the due-care stan-
dard, then she will of course respond via her best-response function to the
firm’s choice of x (yNL(x), which equals yW (x)). Modeling the due-care
standard in this way, we find that the firm will always choose x so that the
consumer meets the due-care standard by setting y = y∗, which in general
is not equal to yNL(x) for any x-choices other than x = x∗. Thus, for x = x∗
but close enough to be in the set M , Shavell’s victim will choose yNL(x) but
our consumer will choose y∗. It is straightforward to show that if the acci-
dent model also used the due-care standard y∗, then SLD would generate
the socially efficient choice of x = x∗ as well.
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3.3. Cumulative Harm with Bilateral Care
We now apply the same protocol to the bilateral-care products liabil-
ity problem when expected harm is cumulative and given by H(q, x, y) =
h(x, y)q2. While this is a special structural form itself (which we employ
for illustrative purposes), our earlier paper (DR2014) shows how, in the
unilateral-care context, a more general model of harm (wherein H(q, x)
is simply convex in both q and x) provides the result that strict liability is
the only resilient liability rule (among NL, SL, and Negligence). We now
demonstrate that strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence
(SLD) is a resilient liability rule (whereas NL is not resilient).
3.3.1. Efficiency. When expected harm is cumulative, then the welfare
function, W (q, x, y) becomes
W (q, x, y) = u(q) − h(x, y)q2 − xq − yq. (13)
Maximizing W with respect to all three variables provides the following
first-order conditions:
q : u′(q) − 2h(x, y)q − x − y = 0, (14)
x :−hx (x, y)q2 − q = 0, (15)
y :−hy(x, y)q2 − q = 0. (16)
Unlike the conditions (Equations (2) and (3)) for the proportional-harm
model, the solutions to Equations (15) and (16) are not independent of q. For
example, dividing both sides of Equation (15) and solving for x yields the
socially efficient firm care level for given (q, y), denoted as xW (q, y). Sim-
ilarly, the solution to Equation (16) is denoted as yW (q, x). Solving Equa-
tions (15) and (16) jointly yields the functions XW (q) and YW (q); thus,
XW (q) = xW (q,YW (q)) and YW (q) = yW (q, XW (q)). Therefore, XW (q)
and YW (q) provide the socially efficient levels of care, but they are now
conditional on the amount consumed. Among other things, this will result
in modification of our model of SLD.
Solving the entire system (i.e., including Equation (14)) yields the
welfare-maximizing point (q∗, x∗, y∗), so that: (1) x∗ = xW (q∗, y∗) and
y∗ = yW (q∗, x∗); (2) x∗ = XW (q∗) and y∗ = YW (q∗); and (3) q∗ solves
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Equation (14), which can be re-expressed as
u′(q∗) − 2h(XW (q∗),YW (q∗))q∗ − XW (q∗) − YW (q∗) = 0.
3.3.2. No Liability. Once again we start with the analysis of the NL
regime, and then compare it with the results from Section 3.3.1. After
having purchased q units, the consumer must decide on the level of care
to take, which is the solution to
min
y
h(x, y)q2 + yq. (17)
Note that the first-order condition is the same as that found above in
Equation (16), so under NL the consumer takes the same care (for any given
level of care x by the firm and any given q), yNL(q, x), as occurs in the
welfare-maximization problem:
yNL(q, x) = yW (q, x) for given (q, x). (18)
The function yNL(q, x) provides the consumer’s best response to the firm’s
choice of care, x , for each level of consumption, q. Thus, if we now use the
consumer’s payoff, recognizing that under NL the consumer must account
for the expected cost of harm, we can find the consumer’s inverse demand
function by solving the following problem:
max
q
u(q) − h(x, yNL(q, x))q2 − yNL(q, x)q − pq, (19)
the only difference from Equation (5) being the quadratic quantity term,
h(x, y)q2. The first-order condition for q is more complicated:
u′(q) − 2h(x, yNL(q, x))q − yNL(q, x) − {hy(x, yNL(q, x))q2 + q}
× (∂yNL(q, x)/∂q) − p = 0. (20)
However, we know that hy(x, yNL(q, x))q2 + q = 0 via the envelope
theorem applied to the consumer’s choice problem for y, evaluated at its
solution yNL(q, x), in Equation (17). Therefore, Equation (20) provides us
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with the consumer’s inverse demand function for the product of the firm as
p(q, x |yNL(q, x)) = u′(q) − 2h(x, yNL(q, x))q − yNL(q, x). (21)
In comparison with Equation (6), the second term on the right is dif-
ferent in two ways. First, the term involving h is multiplied by a “2” on
the left and, second, it is multiplied on the right by “q”. This entire term,
which is themarginal expected harm, acts to rotate the inverse demand curve
inward rather than to shift it downward (as occurred in Equation (6)). Alter-
natively put, in the proportional-harm model the marginal expected harm
affects the intercept of the consumer’s inverse demand function while in
the cumulative-harm model, the marginal expected harm is reflected in the
slope of the consumer’s inverse demand function.9
Thus, the firm’s profit function under no liability, denoted as
πNL(q, x |yNL(x)), is
πNL(q, x |yNL(q, x)) = (u′(q) − 2h(x, yNL(q, x))q)q − yNL(q, x))q − xq.
(22)
The details of the analysis are provided in the Appendix, where we also
show that the firm’s profit-maximizing care level (given output q), denoted
by XNL(q), is generally not equal to the socially efficient level XW (q). For a
given level of output q, XNL(q) exceeds (falls below) that which is socially
efficient if and only if the cross term in the h-function is sufficiently small
(large).10
In particular, consider the case wherein XNL(q) > XW (q) for each q.
This case seems intuitively reasonable, as increasing q causes the firm to
face (stochastically) more incidents of greater harm, so that even though
it is not liable, it will want to further ameliorate the harm-effect since it is
depressing the consumer’s marginal willingness-to-pay (and the extent of
this reduction is exacerbated by the fact that the term enters the demand
9. The exact form of the effect, 2h(x, y)q, reflects the quadratic form assumption
for H(q, x, y). More generally, this marginal effect is Hq (q, x, y), and one would nor-
mally expect that Hq (q, x, y) is increasing in q, again affecting the slope of the inverse
demand function; see the Technical Appendix for DR2014 for details in the unilateral-
care case.
10. More specifically, XNL(q)(>,=,<)XW (q) if and only if dXW (q)/
dq(>,=,<)0 if and only if hyy(hx/hy)(>,=,<)hxy .
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curve both at a rate of twice the average expected harm, and proportional
to the quantity consumed).
This over-supply (or under-supply) of care by the firm, holding q fixed,
is equivalent to Spence’s (1975) analysis of the over- or under-provision of
quality by amonopolist, which can be thought of as a model with no liability
(since the issue there is product quality, not safety). This equivalence occurs
because, in our model, the continuation game for the consumer under NL
is represented by the best response function yNL(q, x), thereby making the
inverse demand function (as shown in Equation (21) above) a function of q
and x (but not of y). That is, under constant marginal costs of production
(as used in Spence and as employed here), the question of over- or under-
supply of quality (care) is fully determined by the sign of the cross derivative
Pqx (q, x) where, here, P(q, x) ≡ p(q, x |yNL(q, x)).11
3.3.3. Strict Liability with a Defense of Contributory Negligence. We
proceed by skipping any discussion of SL alone (due to the moral hazard
problem on the consumer side, as noted earlier, ySL∗ = 0) and analyze the
SLD case instead. We capture the notion of the consumer meeting the due-
care standard by requiring that:
y  YW (Q), (23)
where Q is the common level of consumption of each other (“representa-
tive”) consumer in the market, and therefore not under the control of the
particular consumer at hand. Inequality (23) means that: (1) when choosing
the quantity to demand, the consumer does not influence the amount Q and
(2) when the monopoly firm is choosing the amount of output to produce
per consumer, then Q = q, so that the firm’s choice of output does affect the
due-care standard that the consumer must subsequently meet to avoid being
contributorily negligent. In the proportional-harm model, YW (Q) = y∗ for
all possible levels of Q, but in the cumulative-harm model, since output and
care are inextricably linked, this is not possible. Nevertheless, we will see
that using YW (Q) as the due-care standard for the consumer will result in
11. Using Equation (6) it is immediate that in the proportional harm case, the
cross-derivative is Pqx = 0, meaning that under proportional harm there is neither an
over- nor under-supply of x .
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both the firm and the consumer choosing the socially efficient care levels
for a given level of output. But this is exactly the target behavior under a
resilient liability rule; the efficient adjustment of output is viewed as the
responsibility of other agencies and/or courts tasked with enhancing mar-
ket performance.
Thus, the cumulative-harm version of Equation (8) is
min
y
yq subject to y  YW (Q). (24)
If the consumer meets the due-care standard, her care cost is YW (Q)q and
therefore her payoff at the point of choosing how much of the product to
buy at a price p is:
u(q) − YW (Q)q − pq, (25)
since by meeting the due-care standard, the consumer is in a regime of strict
liability on the part of the firm for all harm.Maximizing the function in (25)
yields the (inverse) demand function:
p(q, x |YW (Q)) = u′(q) − YW (Q). (26)
On the other hand, if the consumer does not meet the due-care standard, her
payoff is as in the NL case:
u(q) − h(x, yNL(q, x))q2 − yNL(q, x)q − pq,
and the (inverse) demand function is the same as under NL, shown in
Equation (21) above:
p(q, x |yNL(q, x)) = u′(q) − 2h(x, yNL(q, x))q − yNL(q, x).
As in the proportional-harm analysis, it is the firm’s choice of x (for any
given q and Q) that determines whether it is optimal for the consumer to
meet, or not meet, the due-care standard. The consumer decides whether
to meet that standard by comparing the cost of meeting the standard and
being fully compensated (that is, YW (Q)q) with the cost of choosing a
(lower) best-response level of care and bearing the expected harm (that is,
h(x, yNL(q, x))q2 + yNL(q, x)q).
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Hence, we again define two sets for the consumer, now indexed by Q
and q:
MC(Q, q) = {x |YW (Q)q  h(x, yNL(q, x))q2 + yNL(q, x)q} (27)
and
mC(Q, q) = {x |YW (Q)q > h(x, yNL(q, x))q2 + yNL(q, x)q}. (28)
For example, if x is in MC(Q, q), then the consumer chooses to meet
the standard, y = YW (Q), and the firm is subject to strict liability. Since
we are analyzing a monopolist facing identical consumers, then Q = q
from the firm’s perspective (the amount consumed will be the same for all
consumers), so the firm is choosing x in MC(Q, q) with Q = q. For con-
venience, let M(q) ≡ MC(q, q) be the set of x-values that induce the con-
sumer to meet the standard for a given q. Similarly, let m(q) ≡mC(q, q) be
the set of x-values that induce the consumer to not meet the standard for a
given q.
In the Appendix we show the following:12
max
x∈M(q)
πSL(q, x |YW (q)) > max
x∈m(q)
πNL(q, x |yNL(q, x)), (29)
where the left-hand side of the inequality in (29) is the profit for the
firm if it chooses x in M(q), thereby inducing the consumer to meet the
standard, and the right-hand side is the profit for the firm if it instead
chooses x in m(q), thereby inducing the consumer to not meet the stan-
dard. Inequality (29) states that, for every choice of q by the firm, it is
more profitable to choose x in M(q) than in m(q). Moreover, we also
show in the Appendix that the firm’s choice of x , denoted as XSLD(q),
is equal to XW (q), so that the result of using a regime of strict liability
with a defense of contributory negligence is that the levels of care cho-
sen are socially efficient, for any given value of q: (XSLD(q),Y SLD(q)) =
(XW (q),YW (q)).
12. In amanner similar to the definition of πNL(q, x |y), the firm’s profit as a func-
tion of q, x , and y, under SL is given by πSL(q, x |y) = (u′(q) − y)q − h(x, y)q2 − xq.
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3.3.4. Summary of Results for the Cumulative Harm Model and the
Resilient Liability Regime. We summarize the results for the NL and SLD
models in the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 3 When expected harm is cumulative:
(a) Under NL, the firm generally does not choose the socially efficient
level of care for any given level of output, q. Although the con-
sumer’s best response function is yNL(q, x) = yW (q, x) for given
(q, x), since the firm’s choice XNL(q) is not socially efficient, nei-
ther is the consumer’s choice YNL(q) = yNL(q, XNL(q)) = YW (q).
(b) Under SLD the firm will always find it optimal to choose a level of
care that induces the consumer to choose the socially efficient level
of care for any given q : Y SLD(q) = YW (q). Moreover, under SLD
the firm will, for any given level of q, choose the socially efficient
level of care: XSLD(q) = XW (q).
Again, possession of monopoly power means that SLD does not result
in the socially efficient level of output; rather, output under SLD is inef-
ficiently low. However, we observe that SLD is a resilient policy in that
(1) it is robust to the unobservability of the firm’s level of care, although
it clearly requires that whether or not the consumer took due care must
be observable and (2) as another agency tasked with improving market
performance undertakes policies (such as output subsidies) that increase
q towards its socially efficient level, q∗, then the equilibrium care levels,
(XSLD(q),Y SLD(q)) = (XW (q),YW (q)), also move toward their socially
efficient levels x∗ = XW (q∗) and y∗ = YW (q∗). The liability regime NL
does not display this robustness to the unobservability of the firm’s level
of care, nor does it coordinate well with another agency or body of law
that is focused on improving market performance, since (in general) profit-
maximizing care under no liability, XNL(q), does not equal socially efficient
care, XW (q), when harm is cumulative.
4. Conclusions
In a previous paper (DR2014), we re-examined the unilateral care model
for products liability, allowing for cumulative expected harm (that is, when
expected harm is increasing at a greater-than-proportional rate); we found
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that the traditional results wherein the level of care was independent of both
the liability regime and the level of output (and therefore, of market struc-
ture) were changed in a substantial manner: with cumulative harm, choice
of care and choice of output level by the firm were inextricably interre-
lated. This fact, and the recognition that issues of market performance (e.g.,
enhancement of competition) and of product performance (particularly, lia-
bility) are generally the province of separate areas of law and/or separate
agencies, led us to setting criteria for selecting a liability regime. We called
the collection of criteria (that the regime should be robust to movements off
of the domain of the analysis and that it should be consistent with market
performance efforts aimed at moving the market and product in the direc-
tion of social efficiency) “resilience” and showed that strict liability was the
unique resilient policy for the unilateral care model.
However, when we extend consideration to the bilateral care case, strict
liability by itself leads to the possibility of moral hazard on the part of the
product’s user. Since the firm embeds the investment in care before the
sale, and the consumer makes a choice about the amount of care in use
to employ after the sale, under strict liability the consumer is tempted to
take zero care since she will be fully compensated by the firm anyway:
strict liability, alone, is no longer resilient. Significantly, a standard mod-
ification is resilient: in comparison with no liability, strict liability with
a defense of contributory negligence is the unique resilient policy for the
liability regime.13
The analysis in the paper employs a three-stage model in an attempt to
model realistically the sequence of choices made by product producers and
product users. In the first stage, the firm picks the amount of output to pro-
duce and the level of care to provide. In the second stage, the consumer
chooses an amount of the product to buy, while in the third stage she chooses
a level of care to take in the use of the product. Working from the end back-
wards we derive a subgame perfect equilibrium wherein under SLDwe find
that the firm would choose a level of care that would induce the consumer
13. A regime of simple negligence, and a regime of negligence with a defense
of contributory negligence, fail to induce socially efficient care on the part of the firm
and the consumer, for a given level of output; see the Appendix for a discussion. Thus,
they fail to be resilient regimes even if firm care is observable by the consumer prior to
purchase and by the court after purchase.
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to choose her efficient level of care; the firm’s choice would also be the
efficient level of care for the firm given the level of output on the market.
Thus, if those agents/agencies in the economy focused on market perfor-
mance work to enhance market performance (e.g., provide a subsidy that
induces output to rise), then product performance will also improve and
move toward the socially efficient level.
Extensions
In DR2014, we also considered alternative market structures (here we
have examined only monopoly), finding how the intuitions from the one-
firm model extend as we increase the number of firms and allow for alter-
native manners in which the potential for harm arising from the multiple
possible sources may be aggregated. This is a potential extension for the
bilateral care case which we have not pursued herein, due to the added space
such work would require for exposition. Other possible avenues for exten-
sion would include: (1) harms to third parties (i.e., not those purchasing the
product for own use) and (2) non-market torts involving bilateral care.
Appendix
This appendix contains details of the analysis; in addition, it describes
some comparative statics results that may be of interest to some readers, but
that are not necessary to make the main points regarding efficiency.
An Example of an h-function
We note a convenient example of our function h(x, y). Let h(x, y) =
A/(xr + yr )1/r with r < 1, A an appropriate constant, and at least one
of x and y are positive; the denominator of h is the constant elasticity-
of-substitution (CES) model of utility or production used in microeco-
nomic analysis.14 Common special cases of h are A/(xy)1/2 when r = 0;
14. In the limiting case wherein r = 1, (hxy)2 = hxx hyy , so strict convexity is lost.
This means that x and y are perfect substitutes in the “production function” for expected
harm, so there will not be a unique solution for the pair. Hence, we restrict r to be less
than 1.
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A(x + y)/xy when r = −1; and A/min{x, y} when r → −∞. With some
work one can show that hxy(>,=,<)0 as r(>,=,<) − 1.
Comparative Statics of Socially Efficient Care in the Case
of Proportional Harm
If we differentiate Equation (2) and collect terms, then we find that
dxW (y)/dy = −hxy/hxx . (A1)
Similarly, if we differentiate Equation (3) and collect terms, then we find
that
dyW (x)/dx = −hxy/hyy . (A2)
Since we have assumed that hxx > 0 and hyy > 0, then the sign of the cross-
term hxy (which indicates how x and y substitute so as to provide any con-
stant level of h(x, y)) determines the sign of the slope of xW (y) as well as
the sign of the slope of yW (x).
The signs of these derivatives matter because they tell us whether the
solution to the overall system, (q∗, x∗, y∗) involves (x∗, y∗) occurring
where xW (y) and yW (x) are downward-sloping or upward-sloping; as we
will see, either case can occur, but importantly, both curves have the same
direction of slope. As an example to illustrate how the properties of h(x, y)
influence the slopes of xW (y) and yW (x), recall the example introduced ear-
lier: h(x, y) = A/(xr + yr )1/r with r < 1. From Equations (A1) and (A2),
we see that the functions xW (y) and yW (x) are downward- (upward-) slop-
ing as r(>,<) − 1.
Analysis of Profit-Maximization under No Liability in the Case
of Proportional Harm
The first-order conditions for the problem maxq,xπNL(q, x |yNL(x)) are
as follows:
q : u′(q) + u′′(q)q − h(x, yNL(x)) − yNL(x) − x = 0, (A3)
x :−hx (x, yNL(x))q − hy(x, yNL(x))q(dyNL(x)/dx)
− q(dyNL(x)/dx) − q = 0. (A4)
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Equation (A4) can be simplified substantially by recognizing that, from the
derivation of yNL(x) from Equation (4), we know the following:
[hy(x, y
NL(x))q + q](dyNL(x)/dx) = 0,
so that Equation (A4) can be more simply written as
x :−hx (x, yNL(x))q − q = 0. (A4′)
That is, the conditions characterizing the firm’s optimal output and care
decisions are Equations (A3) and (A4′). Since (from the earlier analy-
sis) yNL(x) = yW (x), this means that when we compare Equation (A4′)
and Equation (2) from the welfare discussion earlier, we must have that
Equation (A4′) is solved at xNL∗ = x∗. Furthermore, yNL∗ ≡ yNL(xNL∗) =
yNL(x∗) = yW (x∗) = y∗; that is, yNL∗ = y∗. Therefore, under no liability,
the firm and the consumer choose the socially efficient levels of care.
Of course, a glance at Equations (1) and (A3) indicates that qNL∗ = q∗,
since there is an extra term in Equation (1). To see what is happening, sub-
stitute (q∗, xNL∗, yNL∗) into the left-hand side of Equation (A3), which yields
(after re-arrangement):
u′(q∗) − h(xNL∗, yNL∗)q∗ − yNL∗ − xNL∗ + u′′(q∗)q∗. (A5)
The first four terms in expression (A5) add to zero from Equation (1) and
the result that (xNL∗, yNL∗) = (x∗, y∗), but the fifth term is negative by the
assumptions that u′′(q) < 0 for all q and that q∗ > 0. That is, the marginal
profit from one more unit of output under NL, evaluated at the socially effi-
cient outcome (q∗, x∗, y∗), is negative, so the firm would want to reduce
output from q = q∗. Thus, the solution to Equation (A3) necessarily implies
that qNL∗ < q∗; this is a reflection of the monopoly power of the firm.
Finally, since xNL(y) = xW (y) and yNL(x) = yW (x), then the slope prop-
erties of the two NL care functions are the same as under welfare maximiza-
tion: the two functions are downward- (upward-) sloping as hxy is greater
than (respectively, less than) zero.
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Analysis of Proft-Maximization under Strict Liability with a
Defense of Contributory Negligence in the Case of
Proportional Harm
CLAIM 1 x∗ ∈ M . That is, efficient care on the part of the firm will induce
efficient care on the part of the consumer.
Proof. Since y∗ = yNL(x∗), and h(x∗, y∗) > 0 then h(x∗, yNL(x∗)) +
yNL(x∗) = h(x∗, y∗) + y∗ > y∗. Thus, x∗ ∈ M . 
CLAIM 2 For all q, the firm will always prefer to choose a level of care that
will induce the consumer tomeet the due-care constraint. That is, for each q:
max
x∈M
πSL(q, x |y∗) >max
x∈m π
NL(q, x |yNL(x)). (A6)
Proof. maxx,y πSL(q, x |y) provides the maximum profits for the firm
under SL if the firm can choose both x and y without restriction. It is
straightforward to see that it would choose x = x∗ and y = y∗. Thus, for
each q, the firm can achieve this unrestricted maximum by choosing x∗ ∈
M , so
max
x∈M
πSL(q, x |y∗) =max
x,y
πSL(q, x |y). (A7)
From the results of the NL analysis earlier, it is straightforward to see that:
max
x,y
πSL(q, x |y) =max
x
πNL(q, x |yNL(x)). (A8)
Note that the right-hand-side of Equation (A8) is also optimized at (x∗, y∗).
However, the right-hand side of Equation (A8) strictly exceeds the right-
hand side of Equation (A6), since x∗ is not in m, and requiring x ∈m must
therefore be a restriction on the optimal value to the problem. 
Comparative Statics of Socially Efficient Care in the Case of
Cumulative Harm
One can readily show that:
∂xW (q, y)/∂y = −hxy/hxx and ∂yW (q, x)/∂x = −hxy/hyy, (A9)
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meaning that the signs of the slopes (holding q constant) of the xW and yW
functions are again determined by the sign of (−hxy). One can also show
that:
dXW (q)/dq > 0 or dYW (q)/dq > 0 or both> 0 but not both< 0. (A10)
More precisely, the condition on the slope is determined by the magnitude
and sign of hxy :
dXW (q)/dq > 0 if and only if hxy < hyy(hx/hy);
dYW (q)/dq > 0 if and only if hxy < hxx (hy/hx ).
Thus, for example, if hxy < 0, then both XW (q) and YW (q) are increas-
ing in q since the above conditions are always met. When hxy > 0, then
jointly requiring the above conditions is equivalent to the requirement
that: hxy <min{hxx (hy/hx ), hyy(hx/hy)}. This restriction on the magni-
tude of hxy is stronger than that associated with the convexity of h (i.e.,
hxxhyy − (hxy)2 > 0).
Returning to our earlier example wherein h(x, y) = A/(xr + yr )1/r with
r < 1, one can show that the above condition is always met: for this harm
function, XW (q) and YW (q) are always increasing in q for all values of
r < 1. Thus, even though x and y may for some parameter values (i.e., val-
ues of r ) behave like substitutes (that is, one variable increases while the
other decreases) and for other parameter values behave like complements
(they both increase or they both decrease), their socially efficient values
always increase if the amount consumed rises. If we think of consumption
(q) increasing as a result of, say, output subsidies to the firm, then the plan-
ner would also choose to increase both the firm’s and the consumer’s pre-
scribed levels of care.
Analysis of Profit-Maximization under No Liability in the Case of
Cumulative Harm
The first-order conditions for the problem maxq,xπNL(q, x |yNL(q, x))
are as follows (incorporating the first-order condition for the consumer’s
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optimal choice of y):
q : u′(q) + u′′(q)q − 4h(x, yNL(q, x))q − yNL(q, x) − hy(x, yNL(x))
× q2(∂yNL(q, x)/∂q) − x = 0, (A11)
x :−2hx (x, yNL(q, x))q2 − hy(x, yNL(q, x))q2(∂yNL(q, x)/∂x) − q = 0.
(A12)
Let the solution to Equation (A12) be denoted as XNL(q); note that only
q appears because y has been evaluated at yNL(q, x).
We first want to know how XNL(q) is related to XW (q). To see, re-write
Equation (A12) as follows:
−hx (x, yNL(q, x))q2 − q = hx (x, yNL(q, x))q2 + hy(x, yNL(q, x))
× q2(∂yNL(q, x)/∂x). (A13)
The left-hand side of Equation (A13) is the same form as the left-hand side
of Equation (15). If we evaluate the left-hand side of Equation (A13) at x =
XW (q), then the left-hand side would be zero (as seen from Equation (15))
if XNL(q) = XW (q). However, in general, the right-hand side of Equation
(A13) is not zero, so this means that in general, XNL(q) = XW (q).
Since hx < 0 and hy < 0, then if ∂yNL(q, x)/∂x > 0 (i.e., if hxy < 0),
then the right-hand side of Equation (A13) is negative, meaning that it must
be that XNL(q) > XW (q). Note that even if hxy > 0, if hxy < hyy(hx/hy)
then XNL(q) > XW (q). From the earlier discussion of efficiency,
hxy < hyy(hx/hy) if and only if dX
W (q)/dq > 0.
Alternatively, XNL(q) < XW (q) if and only if dXW (q)/dq < 0.
Analysis of Proft-Maximization under Strict Liability with a
Defense of Contributory Negligence in the Case of
Cumulative Harm
CLAIM 3 XW (q) ∈ M(q) for all q. That is (for given q), efficient care on
the part of the firm will induce efficient care on the part of the consumer.
Proof. Recall that M(q) = {x |YW (q)q<h(x, yNL(q, x))q2 +
yNL(q, x)q}. Since yNL(q, x) = yW (q, x), then yNL(q, XW (q)) =
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yW (q, XW (q)) = YW (q). Thus, the inequality above becomes:
YW (q)q<h(XW (q),YW (q))q2 + YW (q)q, which clearly holds for all
q since h(x, y) > 0 for all (x, y). Thus, XW (q) ∈ M(q) for all q. 
CLAIM 4 For all q, the firm always prefers to choose a level of care that will
induce the consumer to meet the due-care standard. That is, for each q:
max
x∈M(q)
πSL(q, x |YW (q)) > max
x∈m(q)
πNL(q, x |yNL(q, x)).
Proof. If the firm chooses q, and x in M(q), so as to maximize its profit,
then it would operate in a regime of SL:
max
q,x∈M(q)
πSL(q, x |YW (q))
= max
q,x∈M(q)
(u′(q) − YW (q))q − h(x,YW (q))q2 − xq. (A14)
If the consumer does not meet the standard then the consumer picks y =
yNL(q, x), and the firm does not face liability for any harm, though the
expected cost of the harm affects the demand for the product. Therefore,
if the firm chooses q, and x in m(q), so as to maximize its profit, then it
would operate in a regime of NL:
max
q,x∈m(q)
πNL(q, x |yNL(q, x))
= max
q,x∈m(q)
(u′(q) − 2h(x, yNL(q, x))q − yNL(q, x))q − xq. (A15)
Now, consider the inner optimization problems (that is, for arbitrary q):
max
x∈M(q)
πSL(q, x |YW (q)) and max
x∈m(q)
πNL(q, x |yNL(q, x)).
The first optimization problem’s first-order condition for arbitrary (unre-
stricted) x is
− hx (x, y)q2 − q = 0 with y = YW (q). (A16)
Denote the solution to the first part of the condition in (A16) as xSLD(q, y).
This is the same first-order condition as Equation (15) in the main text,
so xSLD(q, y) = xW (q, y). In particular, the solution to the x-unrestricted
maximization problem is evaluated at y = YW (q), so xSLD(q,YW (q)) =
xW (q,YW (q)), but this latter term is XW (q), which belongs to M(q).
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Therefore, the solution to the restricted problem (wherein x is restricted
to belong to M(q)) is also
XSLD(q) ≡ xSLD(q,YW (q)) = XW (q).
In other words, the optimal level of care by the firm under SLD, when care
is restricted to induce consumers to choose to meet the due-care standard,
is the socially efficient level of care, XW (q), for any given q.
Next, we claim that the firm prefers to choose from M(q) rather than
from m(q): the firm prefers to induce the consumer to meet the due care
constraint. To see this, consider the optimization problem:
max
x,y
πSL(q, x |y) =max
x,y
u′(q)q − h(x, y)q2 − xq − yq.
In this optimization problem q is given but the firm is free to pick both x and
y. It is straightforward to show that the optimal solution is (XW (q),YW (q)),
so that:
max
x∈M(q)
πSL(q, x |YW (q)) =max
x,y
πSL(q, x |y).
Moreover,
max
x,y
πSL(q, x |y) >max
x,y
πNL(q, x |y)
=max
x,y
(u′(q) − 2h(x, y)q)q − xq − yq,
where the inequality follows because of the 2 multiplying the h(x, y) term
in πNL(q, x |y) versus a 1 multiplying the same term in πSL(q, x |y). Finally,
since requiring x to be in m(q) and allowing the consumer to best-respond
via yNL(q, x) are both restrictions, it must be that:
max
x,y
πNL(q, x |y) max
x∈m(q)
πNL(q, x |yNL(q, x)).
Therefore, we have shown that the firm’s profits are higher when it faces
strict liability for harm by inducing the consumer to meet the due-care stan-
dard by choosing an x in M(q), than when it faces no liability for harm by
inducing contributory negligence on the part of the consumer by choosing
an x in m(q). 
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Simple Negligence, and Negligence with a Defense of Contributory
Negligence, Do Not Induce (XW (q), YW (q))
First consider a simple negligence rule wherein the firm’s due care stan-
dard is XW (q). We argue that it cannot be an equilibrium for the firm to
just meet this standard (and thereby induce socially efficient care on the
part of the consumer as well). Given that the firm at least meets its due care
standard (by choosing x  XW (q)), then the consumer will bear the full
expected harm and things will play out as in NL above. In particular, it was
shown above that XNL(q) > XW (q) as long as dXW (q)/dq > 0 (sufficient
conditions on h(x, y) for this to hold are given above, and it seems like the
most plausible case: as the firm sells more output, it is socially efficient to
increase the firm’s care). Thus, when faced with the negligence standard
XW (q), if the firm complies, then it will actually over-invest in care; and if
it fails to comply, then it will under-invest in care.
Now consider a regime of negligence with a defense of contributory neg-
ligence, with due care standards of XW (q) and YW (q) for the firm and
consumer, respectively. Suppose that the firm just meets its due care stan-
dard, which in turn induces the consumer to just meet her due care standard
(since yNL(q, x) = yW (q, x)). In this case, the socially efficient care lev-
els are being chosen but, again, the consumer is discounting her marginal
willingness-to-pay for the product at the marginal expected harm 2h(x, y)q
because she faces the full expected harm. If the firm were to reduce its
choice of care to XW (q) − ε (and the consumer observes this choice prior to
purchase) the firm would become liable provided the consumer maintained
her care at YW (q). The consumer would prefer to maintain y = YW (q)
and avoid liability; moreover, anticipating compensation from the firm, she
would not discount her marginal willingness-to-pay for the product. Thus
the firm would face marginal liability-related costs based on the average
expected harm h(x, y)q. As in the unilateral-care case, the firm prefers a
regime of strict liability to a negligence regime (both augmented with a
defense of contributory negligence).
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